CDA and values: Interdisciplinarity as a critical turn

Abstract

From their very outset, the disciplines of social science have claimed a need for interdisciplinarity. Proponents of new disciplines have also claimed the whole of human activity as their domain, whilst simultaneously emphasising the need for increased specialisation. Critical social analysis attempts to repair the flaws of specialisation. In this chapter, I argue that the trend towards academic specialisation in social science is most usefully viewed from the perspective of evaluative meaning, and that each new discipline, in emphasising one aspect of a broken conception of humanity, necessarily emphasises one aspect of an already broken conception of value. Critical discourse analysis, qua critical social analysis, may therefore benefit by firstly proceeding from the perspective of evaluative meaning to understand the dynamics of social change and overcome the challenges posed by centuries of intensive specialisation in social science.
Introduction

The perceived need for interdisciplinarity in critical discourse analysis (CDA) is a characteristic, latter-day imperative throughout most social science (Jessop and Sum, 2001). As such, it highlights the fragmenting trajectory that studies of the social world have undergone, most noticeably over the last 150 years. Critical scholarship has its *raison d'être* in that very fragmentation because the first imperative of any critical social science is to develop an historically grounded, comprehensive theory of social change—a ‘critical philosophy’ which sees humanity as an unbroken, historically embedded whole (Marx, 1843/1972, p. 10). Prior to the emergence of disciplines in the mid-nineteenth century, social theory was an integral part of philosophy… . The intrinsic connection between philosophy and the theory of society … formsulates the pattern of all particular theories of social change occurring in the ancient world, in the middle ages, and on the commencement of modern times. One decisive result is the emphasis on the fact that social change cannot be interpreted within a particular social science, but must be understood within the social and natural totality of human life. (Marcuse and Neumann, 1942/1998, p. 95)

In this respect, the contemporary trend towards interdisciplinarity (or ‘transdisciplinarity’ or ‘post-disciplinarity’) throughout social science is, by definition, a critical turn (cf. Fairclough, 2000; Jessop and Sum, 2001).

The central assertions of this chapter are that social science has fractured along lines of evaluative, rather than logical, meaning, and that any critical social science that hopes to transcend disciplinary boundaries will begin with a comprehensive theory of value (cf. Marx, 1973, p. 259). What we call disciplines in social science are historically constituted practices of evaluating the social world in different ways, and it is no more than these different ways of evaluating the social world that define disciplinary boundaries. Disciplinary boundaries are therefore ‘discourse-historical’ phenomena (Wodak, 2000). They are also a function of the increasingly specialised
nature of work in industrialised societies (Innis, 1942). At an even deeper historical level, we can trace the evaluative nature of disciplinarity to two paradoxical histories: the first being a shift of legitimacy from the institutions of the Church and Crown to the institutions of Reason during the Enlightenment; the second being the later shift from a static, Natural Order view of our social universe in the eighteenth century to the more dynamic, Darwinian view characteristic of the nineteenth century (Ware, 1931).

The historical shift in legitimacy from the institutions of *Divinity* (Church and Crown) to the institutions of *Truth* (Science and Reason) seems paradoxical upon inspection, largely because of the lack of difference in the stated scope of the systems’ authority: both have sought to explain and regulate the totality of human affairs. Furthermore, their methods for doing so are indistinguishable, especially in the early stages of disciplinarity. But that is not surprising. The revolution which has become known as the enlightenment was institutional rather than epistemological. It was, in fact, Church scholastics who developed what has become known as ‘scientific method’, a mode of enquiry based on the ‘careful analysis of experience’ which left the Church ‘with a refinement and precision … which the seventeenth century scientists who used it did not surpass in all their careful investigation of method’ (Randall, 1940, p. 178). The similarities between the institutions of *Reason* and *Divinity* are evident when political economy first emerges as a distinct discipline.

**Political economy: the first discipline**

The expansive scope of social science is clear in the earliest formulations of political economy, the first formal discipline of social science of the post-enlightenment period. Early political economists believed that they had discovered an elucidation of natural law, and that its scope extended to all of man’s dealing with man [*sic*] and nature. It was therefore a moral science governing man’s social activity, much the sort of thing that John Locke once hoped to achieve for ethics by applying to that subject the laws discovered by his friend Newton. (Neill, 1949, p. 537)
Destutt de Tracy (1801, in Kennedy, 1979) is exemplary of the expansive character of late-eighteenth to early-nineteenth century social science. He formulated a literal ‘ideology’, a ‘science of ideas’, that aspired to ‘establish a sound “theory of the moral and political sciences”’, and which embraced ‘grammar, logic, education, morality, and “finally the greatest of arts, for whose success all the others must cooperate, that of regulating society”’ (1979, p. 355). It quickly became clear to vested interests that Tracy’s interdisciplinary political economy, and other systems like it, sought to replicate the authoritative scope of the Church and Crown. Consequently, such systems were roundly attacked and dispersed (Kennedy, 1979).

Similarly, in the transition from the Natural Order view of the social world to that of the strong Social Darwinism characteristic of the late nineteenth century, the Natural Order of the social universe was not so much destroyed as it was provided with an increasingly dynamic and scientific explanation of social inequalities. The whole of human life came to be viewed as a struggle for survival, and only the fittest would survive: ‘the Natural Order was for the eighteenth century what evolution became for the nineteenth, the common concept into which every generalisation was thrown’ (Ware, 1931, p. 619). But this latter world view did not supplant the former. The assumptions of Social Darwinism were merely overlaid upon those of the Natural Order: a universal natural order was thereafter seen to emerge, not by the design of a clockmaker God, but from all out, constant competition for survival on the part of every living thing (cf. Tylor, 1877; Ware, 1931).

Mainstream political economy began a rapid descent into a science of price during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, leaving a large semantic residue of values unaccounted for—esthetic, cognitive, social, and moral values, for example. These were taken up, in the first instance, by the newly emerging fields of sociology, psychology, anthropology, political science, and moral philosophy (see, e.g., Perry, 1916). After World War I, the study of society fragments further into the disciplines of propaganda studies, public opinion, business studies, and myriad others (Graham, in press b). This paper seeks to transcend the disciplinary boundaries that have developed and
hardened over the last century and a half by critically analysing the early development of disciplinarity itself. It is an approach grounded in history, political economy, and theories of critical discourse analysis (CDA). It is informed by an historical materialist theory of value which sees the evaluative sediments of historical process in the official discourses of expert power propounded today (Graham, in press a).

On the isolation of methodology

In many respects, my approach to the problems of disciplinarity can be termed ‘discourse-historical’:

the discourse-historical approach attempts to integrate much available knowledge about the historical sources and the background of the social and political fields in which discursive “events” are embedded. Further, it analyzes the historical dimension of discursive actions by exploring the ways in which particular genres of discourse are subject to diachronic change (Wodak 2000).

However, I propose no specific methodology for analysis here, in so far as I do not present any fine-grained linguistic analyses of explicit or implicit evaluations in the texts that follow. I have presented approaches to doing so elsewhere in far greater detail than is appropriate here (Graham 2001; in press a). Central to my argument, and what I highlight in the following texts, is that any truly critical social science will avoid, as far as possible given current circumstances, ‘an artificial separation of methodology from philosophy’ (Harvey, 1973, p. 11). That separation, as I will show, is the very source of post-enlightenment disciplinarity and its necessarily broken view of our social world. From that view

flows a tendency to regard facts as separate from values, objects as independent of subjects, “things” as possessing an identity independent of human perception and action, and the “private” process of discovery as separate from the “public” process of communicating the result. (Harvey, 1973, p. 11)

Separating in theory what is inseparable in practice creates further artificial disjunctions ‘between observation on the one hand and the values on the basis of which we place the stamp of moral
approval or disapproval on the other’ (1973, p. 14). Consequently, disciplinary social science has developed by concealing from itself the evaluative biases of its institutionalised modes of observation.

Discourse-historical research into value as a “technical” concept – that is, as the focus of continually fragmenting formal intellectual disciplines in social science – informs my approach to understanding how aspects of value are deployed and propagated in contemporary discourses of power. History is the transcendent, interdisciplinary means by which we can grasp both the brokenness and totality of contemporary social life. Analysis of ‘orientational’, ‘evaluative’, or ‘attitudinal’ meaning provides the methods by which we might understand and analyse particular instances in which the artificially separated spheres of human values are deployed to emphasise particular dimensions of value whilst suppressing others (cf. Graham, in press a; Lemke, 1998; Martin, 2000). Political economy, in its classical form, seeks to understand the means, modes, and relations by which values are produced, reproduced, propagated, and transformed as (for instance) the source and substance of legitimate discourses of power. It is these elements and, more importantly, their useful synthesis for an interdisciplinary CDA, that I highlight in this chapter.

I begin my historical investigation by presupposing an already broken philosophy, in which the broad evaluative domains of the True (Logic), the Good (Ethics), and the Beautiful (Aesthetics) have been theoretically and actively separated and held apart in philosophy for centuries (Lemke, 1995, pp. 178-9; Hegel, 1816/1995, p. 407; Russell, 1946/1991, pp. 54-5). Each of these evaluative domains implies its opposite, along with endless possibilities for semantic gradations and interplays within and between those domains. I further assume that any change, or reordering, of evaluative domains, whether in theory or practice, is intimately ‘connected with a change in the social system’, and that ‘[m]ost sciences, at least at their inception, have been connected with some form of false belief, which gave them a fictitious value’ (Russell, 1946/1991, p. 53). I take the terms ‘false belief’ and ‘fictitious value’ perhaps somewhat differently to Russell, who compares ‘astronomy … with
astrology’, and ‘chemistry with alchemy’, implying that superstition naturally informs older traditions, whereas newer disciplines are inevitably underpinned by more scientific assumptions (1946/1991, p. 53). I assert that the ‘false beliefs’ from which new sciences draw their original legitimacy are based on the ‘fictitious value’ that cleaves to particular persons who have access to previous forms of what Innis (1942) calls ‘knowledge monopolies’. In what follows, I foreground the historical ‘hybridisation’ and reordering (or ‘restructuring of the order’) of knowledge monopolies along institutional lines, which are intertextually redefined in the emergence of each new discipline of social science (cf. Fairclough, 1992, p. 222; Lemke, 1995, pp. 178-80).

The genre I have chosen to exemplify my argument is that of academic journal articles. I provide examples from the fields of economics, political science, psychology, and ethics. Where possible, I have used editorial introductions to first issues of journals for newly-emerging disciplines, thus focusing on the intertextual separation of new disciplines from their “parent” disciplines. By ‘intertextual’, I mean the ‘actual utterances’ of ‘distinct social voices’ which arise from and constitute the formal and institutional ‘stratification of language in actual use’ (Lemke, 1995, p. 24). These stratifications are evident in ‘social class dialects, languages of special groups, professional jargons’, including those of academic and professional groupings (Bakhtin, 1935/1981, in Lemke, 1995, p. 24). In order to establish a new branch of social science, its proponents must actively define their discipline in intertextual distinction to their parent disciplines. From the late nineteenth century onwards, formal intertextual separation within the academic fields of social science becomes a function of new academic journals.

The journals I have chosen here have been influential in the formation and maintenance of their respective disciplines. All continue to be published up to the present day. All are for English speaking audiences, although foundational scholars from non-English speaking backgrounds, in each of the disciplines I discuss here, have published in the journals. While I expect the English-ness of the journals to have some associated idiosyncrasies, I have no reason to suspect that the fundamental
dynamic is any different, at least in other European or western contexts. Later in the paper, I give examples of contemporary power discourses to show how the fragmented and contradictory evaluative stances peculiar to various contemporary disciplines are historically hybridised and conflated in public discourse.

Beginning in the middle

Between the years of 1916 and 1921, mainstream political economy finally withers from being a social “science of everything” to being concerned solely with the study of prices. The following two texts are exemplary illustrations:

[1] Consider the ways in which a single object such as a book may be praised or disparaged. … These various properties “cheap,” “mendacious,” “ignorant,” “edifying” and “crude,” differ characteristically as a group, from such other properties as the book’s color, weight, and size. They are the terms in which the book may be estimated…. We need the term “value” as a term to apply to all the predicates of this group. We may then speak of economic values, moral values, cognitive values, religious values and aesthetic values as various species of one genus. It follows that we should no longer speak of economics, after the manner of von Weiser as “treating the entire sphere of value phenomena”; but as one of the group of value sciences, having certain peculiar varieties of value as its province, and enjoying critical competence or authority only in its own restricted terms. (Perry 1916, pp. 445-6)

[2] An eminent European economist, writing seventeen years ago, ascribed the confusion [in economics] to our general pre-occupation with the theory of value. He declared in so many words that “the most radical and effective cure for this confusion would be to do away with the whole theory of value” and to begin at once with “an explanation of prices and the general causes governing them”. He held this procedure to be quite possible and wholly advantageous. The thesis which at that time sounded so radical has since become almost commonplace. (Parry, 1921, p. 123).

In texts [1] and [2], from two preeminent economics journals, we see that within a mere five years, various aspects of value get formally and finally “divided up” along semantic lines amongst a group of value sciences, with economics finally being confined to the explanation of prices and the general causes governing them. The semantic residue includes, most broadly, cognitive values, religious values and aesthetic values as various species of one genus. Value thus becomes, in a formal sense,
a superordinate abstraction in the study of human affairs, and the object of social science is theoretically broken into ever-smaller pieces. Since the early twentieth century, there have been numerous additions to, and subdivisions of, social science disciplines. A common feature of all the value sciences that emerged during the nineteenth century is that they claim, from their beginnings, the whole of human affairs as their domain, despite ostensibly focusing on a specific aspect of humanity (the economic, the political, the psychological, etc). Consequently, they all claim a need for interdisciplinarity from their very beginnings.

Bringing discipline to the social universe

I begin here with the discipline of psychology because its emergence is very closely related to the reduction of political economy, the first distinct discipline of social science, to a study of prices (cf. Graham, in press b; Perry, 1916). The following text [3] is an editorial introduction from the first issue of the journal Mind: A quarterly review of philosophy and psychology, first published in 1876, ten years before Freud had established his private practice in Vienna:

[3] Theoretic psychology has its practical application … in the balanced training and culture of the individual mind, while it deals separately with functions whose natural play stands greatly in need of regulation … A true psychology ought unquestionably to admit of being turned to the educator’s purpose, and in no direction has the new journal a more effective opening at the present time. To speak, in the same connection, of such subjects as Logic, Aesthetics and Ethics, may seem strange, but there is good reason for so doing. The existence … of the three distinct bodies of doctrine … is a signal confirmation of the theoretic distinction of Knowing, Feeling and Willing which has established itself, not without difficulty, in modern psychology … From a philosophical point of view it is of course needless to justify the consideration of the true, the beautiful and the good in a journal whose subject is Mind. (Mind, 1876, pp. 4-5)

The editor of Mind is proposing that a true psychology not only embraces the whole human sensorium, but the whole of philosophy as well. Further, psychology is responsible, through education, for the training and culture of the individual mind which is greatly in need of regulation. The introduction acknowledges the difficulty already had by modern psychology in theoretically
separating Knowing, Feeling and Willing into three distinct bodies of doctrine. As such, it acknowledges difficulties which are today inverted in the widespread quest for interdisciplinarity: contemporary social science, as this volume indicates, is struggling to overcome the difficulties created by the institutionalisation of theoretic separations that stem from the enlightenment era—those between mind and body; facts and values; subjects and objects, and so on (Harvey, 1973, p. 14). But the phenomenon of disciplining social science does not stop with those separations; it begins with them as presuppositions.

The original brokenness of disciplinarity can be seen in the ‘variety of fields’ which might be included in psychology:

[3.1] physiological investigations of the Nervous System in man and animals, by which psychology is brought into relation with biology and the physical sciences generally; objective studies of all natural expressions or products of mind like Language, and all abnormal or morbid phases up to Insanity; comparative study, again objective, of the manners and customs of Human Races as giving evidence of their mental characteristics, also of mind as exhibited by the lower Animals … No statement, however, can come near to exhausting the matter of psychology (Mind, 1876, pp. 3-4)

And so it has come to pass. The first editor of Mind was prescient in mapping the future terrain of psychological sub-disciplines. Today, psychology is institutionalised in myriad and conflicting schools, both theoretical and applied. Accompanying the institutionalisation of these schools is an ever-burgeoning flood of paper filled with arguments about the validity of this or that approach to the study of the human psyche, many underpinned by the assumption that psychology needs to be brought into relation with biology and the physical sciences generally. Such an assumption presumes that human mental processes formerly stood apart from the biological, physical, and social worlds. It also assumes that we can observe the phenomena of mind objectively. But ‘the act of observing is the act of evaluation and to separate them is to force a distinction on human practice that does not in reality exist’ (Harvey, 1973, p. 15). While text [3] acknowledges a link between philosophy and psychology, it does so at the expense of separating the two. It also declares an
imperative to study the true, the beautiful and the good, all of which are subordinated to the modernist imperative for objectivity—the generative force of specialisation.

The simultaneously totalising yet fragmented grasp of early psychology is repeated in the emergence of every new discipline in social science. Take, for instance, the formal emergence of modern ‘political science’, a term which, says Smith (1886) in his introduction to the first issue of *Political Science Quarterly*, ‘is greatly in need of definition’:

[4] It seems preferable, under these circumstances, to recognize but one political science—the science of the state. The relations with which this science deals may, of course, be subdivided and treated separately. … We may distinguish between the various functions of the state. But there is no good reason for erecting these various groups of questions into distinct political sciences. The connection of each with all is too intimate.

In endeavoring to distinguish political science from the so-called political sciences, I have no thought of denying the close connection which subsists between political science, as here defined, and the sciences of economics and law.

[…]

The theory of governmental administration is largely economic; and state-finance is a part of the administrative system of the state, is based on economic theory, and is regulated by law. … All the social relations with which politics, law and economics have to do lie within the domain of ethics. Duty, loyalty, honesty, charity—these ideas are forces that underlie and support the state; that give to law its most effective sanction; that cross and modify the egoistic struggle for gain. (Smith, 1886, pp. 3-4)

Again we see in [4] that, like psychology, the purpose of political science is to organise sciences which might be subdivided and treated separately: the various branches of politics, law and economics, the so called political sciences, which Smith defines in distinction to a more general political science. Smith firstly defines the whole of political science in terms of a specific evaluative domain: the Good, or ethics. Political science is the science of the state. The state is a set of social relations given force by specific ideas: Duty, loyalty, honesty, charity. Thus, all the political sciences lie within the domain of ethics. There are of course a far wider range of evaluative domains implicit in text [4], despite Smith’s claim that political science is at root a science of the Good.
Those domains are evident when Smith defines political science as a group of particular social sciences:

[4.1] Social science, in the broadest sense, deals with all the relations of man [sic] in society; more precisely, with all the relations that result from man’s social life. It may be questioned whether it is proper to speak of a social science. We certainly have no general social science in the sense that we have particular social sciences. In politics, in economics, in law and in language, we are able to some extent trace phenomena to their causes, to group facts under rules and rules under principles. But the laws which underlie man’s social life as a whole have not been grasped or formulated. Social science or sociology, if we use the term, is therefore simply a convenient general expression for a plurality of social sciences. (Smith, 1886, pp. 1-2).

While Smith claims that political science is a science of the Good, the Good is already subordinated to the tenets of Logic (i.e., it is firstly a science of the True). All social sciences depend on empirical methods, and seek to trace social phenomena to their causes, to group facts under rules and rules under principles. The ultimate result of a social science would be the identification of the laws which underlie man’s social life as a whole, like early political economy. Smith’s definition separates social science from the ‘physical’ sciences, except in terms of method—‘the collection of data by statistical observation’ (1886, p. 2). Again, philosophy underpins the whole discipline of political science from its inception. But philosophy gets further elided from its purview as a direct function of disciplinarity. Smith’s purpose in defining political science is that ‘the thoughts of the definer’ can be ‘thought over … until the disciple has gained the same outlook over the subject as the master—and then he no longer needs the definition’ (1886, p. 1). In other words, the purpose of having a defined discipline is that the basic evaluative assumptions of the discipline – that which is assumed to be True and Good – go unquestioned so that the disciple gains the same worldview as the master. Here we find the essence of disciplinarity: the disciple is disciplined not to think beyond the evaluative foundations of the discipline. The discipline thus hides its own evaluative biases from its disciples by inculcating them as presuppositions.

We can see similar phenomena in the emergence of sociology as a formal discipline:
Sociology is an advanced study, the last and latest in the entire curriculum. It involves high powers of generalization, and what is more, it absolutely requires a broad basis of induction. It is largely a philosophy, and in these days philosophy no longer rests on assumptions but on facts. To understand the laws of society the mind must be in possession of a large body of knowledge. This knowledge should not be picked up here and there at random, but should be instilled in a methodical way. It should be fed to the mind with an intelligent purpose in view, and that purpose should be the preparation of the mind for ultimately entering the last and most difficult as well as most important field of human thought, that of sociology. Therefore, history, political economy, and the other generic branches should first be prosecuted as constituting the necessary preparation for the study of higher ordinal principles. (Ward, 1895, pp. 25-26)

Ward’s sociology is, again, a science of the whole human condition. Again, it is a synthesis of already existing fields of study: history, political economy, and the other generic branches. It is explicitly a philosophy that rests on facts. Here, at the most abstract level of social science, we find an empiricist philosophy of the True, with no overt reference to either the Good or the Beautiful—it is a philosophy of method. The disciplining aspect of sociology is similar to that outlined by Smith (1886) for political science: knowledge must be instilled in a methodical way; it should be fed to the mind of the disciple with an intelligent purpose, namely, the preparation of the mind for the most important field of human thought which is sociology. Ward’s view of minds that can be fed with facts in order to understand the laws of society is one that remains prevalent today. So too is the assumption that everything in human society can be understood in terms of Truth or objective facts (Lemke, 1995, pp. 178-80).

The establishment of sociology as a formal discipline seems to have met with the most resistance of all the disciplines established in the late-nineteenth century, probably because of its explicit intent to subordinate the entirety of social science, without exception, to its own principles of classification (cf. Ford, 1909; Giddings, 1891; Hayes, 1905; Simmel, 1896; Smith, 1886; Tylor, 1877). The elision of the broad evaluative domains of the Good and the Beautiful from the philosophy of early sociology, or rather their subordination to the True, creates paradoxes which become apparent very early in the literature. The immediate effect is that the Good gets cast as an
object of sociological investigation, and thus as an object of factual investigation (cf. Carrel 1907; Hayes, 1918; Höfdding, 1905; Wallace, 1883). The implications are twofold: first, the True and the Good get further separated in theory, the latter being rendered as an object of the former. Second, the ‘facts’ of what it means to be Good get reduced to the methods of inductive empiricism—the ineffable evaluative domain of the Good literally gets reduced to a quantifiable, observable object. The second of these paradoxes is perhaps more problematic than the first. That is because, for the Good to be measured empirically, the sociologist must first have a taxonomy of predefined categories into which all the measures of Goodness are organised. So, like the disciple of Smith’s political science, the discipline proceeds by hiding its own evaluative presuppositions from its disciples by categorial inculcation.

The inherent paradoxes in the fracture between the truths of sociological investigation and other evaluative dimensions of social life become apparent very early in sociology, when the study of ethics is formally rendered as an object of sociological enquiry:

[6] The task of sociology is to study social life in all its manifold forms of manifestation. Ethical ideals and ethical endeavors, therefore, are objects of sociological research. They are working factors in social development, while they are themselves effects and symptoms of social conditions, results of social development.

They have their roots in the inner world of individuals; but this inner world itself is not indifferent for sociology, which traces the interaction of individual and society in all its finest ramifications. The inner world does not develop itself independently of the outer. Social conditions determine directly or indirectly that which the individual conscience adopts as ideal or as true. Very often the character and the direction of ethical life are determined by physiological or social heredity. …

From this point of view, sociology is a more comprehensive science than ethics, which is a more special and limited science. Sociology stands in a similar relation to ethics as does psychology. Ethical ideals and endeavors are not only sociological, but also psychological phenomena; they are, therefore, objects for psychology as well as for sociology, and psychology is, in its turn, a more comprehensive science than ethics. (Höfdding, 1905, p. 672)

In [6] we have a reordering of evaluative domains along disciplinary definitions. Sociology traces the interaction of individual and society in all its finest ramifications. Ethical ideals and endeavours
are therefore objects of sociology. But they are also objects for psychology, which is concerned with what the individual conscience adopts as ideal or as true. But people’s psychology is also an object for sociology because the inner world of individuals is determined by social conditions which, in turn, determine what people perceive as ideal or as true. Thus, according to sociology, ethics is subordinate in scope to psychology, which is, in turn, subordinate in scope to sociology.

Splitting the study of individual values (psychology) from social values (sociology), and rendering them as objects for enquiry, creates further paradoxes for early sociology, especially in terms of its own truths. If that which the individual conscience adopts as ideal or as true is determined by social conditions, and ethical life is determined by social conditions and physiological or social heredity, then the truths of sociological investigation, are, according to Höfding’s definition, subject to the physiological and social heredity of individual sociologists, as well as the social conditions that the institution of sociology creates for its disciples: sociology, by its own definition, creates its own ethics and its own psychologies. The imperative for strongly disciplining the budding sociologist is barely implicit in Höfding’s definition, which is a very typical formulation from the era (see, e.g. Galton, 1876, 1886, 1887). For sociology, discipline – the systematic inculcation of evaluative assumptions and normative imperatives – is necessary in order to avoid the infinite loop of physiological, cultural, and social relativism as regards sociologists’ perceptions of what constitutes social facts. Like the disciples of political science, students of sociology must firstly render their foundational assumptions invisible to themselves.

Höfding presents ethical principles as ideals and endeavours, distinct from facts—they are presented as epiphenomena of sociological and psychological processes. By defining them along disciplinary lines, the inner and outer worlds of humans becomes theoretically more distant, and the ethical dimension of human Being also gets further separated from from the sociology of societies and the psychology of individuals, thereby becoming taxonomically less significant in terms of
explanatory power. The *Good* is thus reduced to an object of intellectual curiousity rather than being seen as an intrinsic aspect of human association and a prime motivator of action.

Ethics responds to sociology with an historical reminder. But it does so by intertextually appropriating, as the basis of morality, prevailing notions of racial betterment – eugenics – which became the dominant paradigm for social enquiry throughout the west, from the early twentieth century until 1945 (Paul, 1984):

[7] In the history of philosophy the science of morals preceded that of sociology. … it is the first parent of every science, present or future, which treats of the actions of men. Sociology and its branches or departments have only statistical value unless they make inductions from their researches with a view to racial benefit, and the making of these inductions is necessarily moral. … There are social as well as individual morals. … If sociology has not a moral purpose, it is an intellectual endeavor to obtain data as to the behavior of men in society and would take rank with other branches of human knowledge having no direct bearing upon the welfare of humanity. If, on the contrary, sociology has a moral purpose, then it appears as a branch or offshoot of the moral stem.

If we consider that effort of sociology which aims at the improvement of the race by means of eclectic mating, we shall see at once that beneath the genetic process advocated there is a moral purpose. The advocates of eugenic practice, that practice whereby a good heredity is sought by the marriage of the most efficient, physically and mentally, and the consequent elimination of the physically and mentally most deficient, have avowedly in view the general improvement of the race and not the mere gratification of the breeder’s pride or of a scientific curiosity. (Carrell, 1907, pp. 448-449)

Once again, [7] is an attempt to intertextually reorder discourses within competing disciplinary frameworks according to evaluative meanings. As a discipline, ethics, or moral philosophy, becomes the *science of morals* and thus precedes sociology in history—it becomes the *first parent of every science, present or future*. Sociology is thus an historical *branch or offshoot of the moral stem* because it aims at a *moral purpose: the improvement of the race* by means of *eugenic practice*, by *the marriage of the most efficient, physically and mentally, and the consequent elimination of the physically and mentally most deficient*, which is, according to Carrel, *necessarily moral*. In [7] we see evidence of an almost total historical hybridisation and reordering of disciplinary discourses.
Carrel fuses Social Darwinist assumptions with the practice of moral philosophy and the assumptions of eugenic sociobiology and early sociology in an attempt to reorder disciplinary discourses in favour of ethics. This is a pattern repeated over and over, throughout the social sciences, through to the present day.

Heading backwards into the future

One could proceed in far more detail, *ad infinitum*, tracing the continual hybridisation, fragmentation, and reordering of academic discourses into what have become the myriad disciplines of contemporary social science. But the main implications of the general patterns thus far noted are these: i) that the discourse-historical roots of all contemporary social sciences are to be found in the institutions in which they were firstly developed as a coherent whole, namely the mediaeval institutions of the Church and Crown; ii) that at every step, each new social science has attempted to grasp the whole of human existence as its domain of authority; iii) that the ordering and reordering of academic discourses into, within, and between the disciplines of social science has taken place firstly along evaluative rather than epistemological lines, privileging certain dimensions of evaluative meaning over others; iv) that because centuries of historical work has gone into fracturing social sciences into myriad fragments of hermetically and linguistically sealed expertise, certain dimensions of evaluative meaning can easily be foregrounded in order to motivate masses of people, while others can be totally suppressed; and, v), because of i), ii), iii) and iv), we would expect to see, in practically any privileged public voice in contemporary society, historical heteroglots of evaluative hybrids that collapse and conflate contradictory evaluative resources which have been developed throughout the history of social-scientific disciplinarity, often in separation from each other. In what follows, I show how those resources are deployed in contemporary discourses of power.
Latter-day Princes and their historical hybridisation

Today, the most powerful discourses fuse and deploy any and all historical evaluative resources without regard for their origins, precisely because those resources have become generally unrecognisable due to centuries of hybridisation and decades of hermetic specialisation. Here is a superlative example:

[8] In my faith tradition, the true prophet of God's message for humankind is the one who comes forth to say: I have been called, as we have all been called, to bring good news to the poor. To bring healing to the sick. To mend the broken-hearted. To speak out clearly on behalf of the oppressed. Dr. King reminded us that prophetic truth is marching on.

He taught us that there is no such thing as partial freedom. All of our people must be free from economic privation, or none of our people will be fully free. In his last speech, delivered from the pulpit of Mason Temple in Memphis, Tennessee – when he told of his vision from the mountaintop – he reminded us of the urgent need to build "a greater economic base." (Gore, 2000)

That is a former vice-President of the United States, not a senile Pope, compressing at least five millenia of heteroglossic resources into 133 words to propagate the divinity, desirability, and necessity of a dogmatically Marxist proposition (cf. Lasswell 1927; Lemke 1998). Gore’s speech intertextually conflates the legitimacy of God, political economic expertise; liberal doctrines of freedom; Marxist doctrines of emancipatory technological development; the very ancient priestly tradition of prophesy; the socialist politics of economic equality; and the Christian ethic of unselfish, sympathetic action, to name just a few. The evaluative resources Gore deploys can be detailed and understood both as phenomena with distinct historical, institutional, and intellectual pedigrees, and as resources for exercising power over societies which have been developed and reproduced over many years, some since the earliest stages of history (Graham in press a).

But we cannot see evaluative hybrids, like that of Gore’s, in an historical vacuum. Nor are the propositional logics of historically distinct discourses sufficient basis for seeing the effects of
disciplinarity upon the way discourses of power are deployed today. Here are three examples spanning precisely 247 years, putting forward essentially identical propositions:

[8] Since the introduction of the new artillery of powder guns … and the discovery of wealth in the Indies … war is become rather an expense of money than men, and success attends those that can most and longest spend money: whence it is that prince’s [sic] armies in Europe are become more proportionable to their purses than to the number of their people; so that it uncontrollably follows that a foreign trade managed to best advantage, will make our country so strong and rich, that we may command the trade of the world, the riches of it, and consequently the world itself.
(Bolingbroke 1752 as cited in Viner 1948)

[9] No economic policy is possible without a sword, no industrialization without power. Today we have no longer any sword grasped in our fist, how can we have a successful economic policy? England has fully recognized this primary maxim in the healthy life of States; for centuries England has acted on the principle of converting economic strength into political power, while conversely political power in its turn must protect economic life. The instinct of self preservation can build up economics, but we sought to preserve World Peace instead of the interests of the nation, instead of defending the economic life of the nation with the sword and of ruthlessly championing those conditions which were essential for the life of the people. (Hitler 1923).

[10] The hidden hand of the market will never work without a hidden fist – McDonald’s cannot flourish without McDonnel Douglas, the builder of the F-15. And the hidden fist that keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley’s technologies is called the United States Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. “Good ideas and technologies need a strong power that promotes those ideas by example and protects those ideas by winning on the battlefield,” says the foreign policy historian Robert Kagan. “If a lesser power were promoting our ideas and technologies, they would not have the global currency that they have. And when a strong power, the Soviet Union, promoted its bad ideas, they had a lot of currency for more than half a century.” (Friedman 1999, p. 84)

Mercantilist [8], fascist [9], and neoliberal [10] discourses about foreign policy are logically indistinguishable. Each is based on two propositions which are in a relation of circular causality: that military supremacy is necessary for economic strength, and that economic strength is necessary for military supremacy. It is beyond these historically stable propositions, in the evaluative domain of meaning, that we can see the different historical forces informing each utterance. Bolingbroke’s mercantilism [8] is deeply embedded in the evaluative biases of the Natural Order. It is the size of princes’ purses that determines their success in war because war is become rather an expense of money than men. And while wealth exists in the Indies, it is not the kind of wealth that can benefit
an indigenous people in the way it can benefit princes in Europe. Bolingbroke is assuming a natural social order consisting of social units with essentially fixed values. They require little or no explanation. The most important social unit is a single person, the prince, having dominion over an irrelevant number of people. The number of people is irrelevant because people, as well as new artillery of powder guns, can be bought, allowing the Prince to command the trade of the world, the riches of it, and consequently the world itself.

Hitler’s discourse [9] is clearly infused with the evaluative biases of race eugenics, twentieth-century nationalism, and Social Darwinism, all of which are intimately related. He prescribes a survivalist doctrine of economic life at a national level. World Peace can only be preserved at the expense of the interests of the nation, and against the natural instinct of self-preservation. Those interests, essential for the life of the people, are economic and can only be defended with the sword. Hence war becomes a necessity for the self preservation and healthy life of States. There is a more dynamic social taxonomy inherent in the fascist worldview than in that of mercantilism. The basic unit of analysis is the State, and the international order of States is subject to the law of natural selection: survival of the fittest. Thus the social order of States is subject to change according to militaristic values—the law of the sword. The evaluative logic of eugenics combines with mercantilist assumptions, and the static hierarchy of the Natural Order is overlaid with dynamic, Social Darwinist discourses of survival.

By the time Friedman (1999) writes, fascism and mercantilism have ostensibly passed into history. The mysteries of the market and its hidden hand have replaced the older gods as the ultimate arbiter of human fortune. But the hidden hand cannot work without a hidden fist. Friedman’s is a worldview that promotes the values of banal consumerism and conflates them with massive violence: good ideas and technologies depend on the United States Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. Thus a global hamburger franchise cannot function without the aid of F-15 fighters. Mass indigestion is implied. Moral values (good ideas) must be backed by military force and
propaganda (*a strong power that promotes those ideas*) so *bad ideas* are defeated. The mythical battle of good versus evil, formerly presided over by the priestly castes, informs foreign policy, and now takes place in the context of a globalised neoliberalism presided over by econometricians, the high priests of the mysterious *hidden hand*. Mercantilism, totalitarianism, nationalism, and perverse neoliberalism are conflated with social theory, political science, psychology, moral philosophy, transnational commerce, and the most ancient of religious impulses. *Winning on the battlefield* is necessary so that people can feel secure consuming hamburgers and using computers: the final triumph of good over evil. The political unit of analysis becomes *the world*, the entire universe of human activities. The correlational, agentive factors for analysis in Friedman’s new universe of conflicting values are ‘super-empowered individuals’ and ‘nation-states’; ‘super-markets’ and ‘superpowers’; and ‘the traditional balance between states and states’ (1999, pp. 42-3). But atop this dynamic world of conflict, arbitrated by money-values and ultimate violence, stands ‘super-empowered individuals’: the neoliberal world of globalisation ‘gives more power to individuals than ever before. For instance … America … launched cruise missiles at an individual [Osama bin Laden] — as though he were a nation state’ (1999, p. 43). Despite centuries of supposed progress, war and trade remain ‘inseparable’ in practice (Armitage and Graham, 2000, pp. 117-19), and a new age of despotic Princes appears to be upon us.

Concluding remarks

No critical social science can function from within any of the isolated bunkers created by disciplinarity over the last century and a half. The dynamics of specialisation in general are a function of a ‘civilization dominated by machine industry industrialism’: the fetishes of specialisation and the production of excess preclude the possibility of understanding either ourselves or our place in history (Innis, 1942, p. 33). A narrowly defined social-scientific disciplinarity also precludes understanding our current civilization, because an historical totality of human values has
now become an instaneously mediated commonplace throughout an increasingly interdependent humanity.

Today’s human relationships are mediated globally and instantaneously. Every aspect of human Being has been commercialised, while every aspect of commerce remains intimately connected to globally active military complexes. Seen as artificially separated value systems, as separate value sciences, each with their own domain of human experience, the very idea of disciplinised social sciences is self-evidently insufficient for comprehending such a world. Each object of social science, and each compartment of social science, is itself a social subject. Each acts and impacts upon the others according to its own evaluative logics – through policy and other forms of mass-mediated public discourse, through institutional relations and disjunctions – to order and reorder the importance of specialised ways of seeing, being, and (inter)acting (Fairclough, 2000). Each discipline is a discourse community and a social practice. Each disciplinised social science has its roots in a broken language and a common charter: the language is that of a broken philosophy; the charter is that of the whole human condition. Just as it has become more necessary than ever to understand ourselves as part of a global totality – as particular humans embedded in humanity in general – an historically comprehensible critical philosophy has become more necessary than ever.

If we accept that our social environment is ultimately coordinated in the domain of meaning, the entry point for any critical social science must begin with an analysis of meaning. However, in seeking interdisciplinarity, CDA risks emulating the totalising grasp of any social science. If we accept that social science has fragmented into disciplines along the semantic fault lines of evaluative meaning, any critical turn in social science will begin with a unified theory of evaluative meaning. If we are to make sense of the profound changes we are going through as a species, we must understand the nature of our species—our common humanity—not as merely psychological, economic, political, ethical, or merely discoursal; we must understand the dynamics of meaning
making as the dynamics of our association. A genuinely critical discourse analysis is the beginning of any critical social science, not its end.
Bibliography


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1 The *True* can be generally said to be realised semantically as degrees of ‘warrantability’, ‘probability’, and in the lexical resources of ‘modality’; the *Good* can be generally said to be realised semantically as degrees of ‘normativity’, ‘usuality’, ‘desirability’, ‘humorousness’, and in the lexical resources of ‘social sanction’, ‘social esteem’, ‘affect’, and ‘obligation’; and the Beautiful can be generally said to be realised in the semantics of ‘desirability’ and in the lexical resources of ‘appreciation’ (cf. Graham, in press; Lemke, 1998; Martin 2000).